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December 19 , 1996 K F U 
50 
A10 
DOCKET NO flfrOtftp '°^ 
Ms. Marilyn Branch 
Office of the Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: State v. James Dean Classon and Daniel E. Classon. No. 
930186-CA 
Utah R. App. P. 24(i) Supplemental Authority Letter 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
Pursuant to rule 24 (i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I 
am citing State v. Rex Newman, No. 950208-CA (Utah App. November 
29, 1996), as supplemental authority in support of Point I, pp. 
11-13, in the State's brief in State v. Classon. I have attached 
a copy of the Newman case. Oral argument is set in this matter 
for January 21, 1996. 
I appreciate your prompt distribution of this letter to the 
Court. 
Sincerely, 
J 7 ^ - ^ ^ 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Margaret P. Lindsay 
Kristina M. Neal 
FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. NOV 2 9 1996 
IN THE UTAH COORT OF APPEALS ^ ^
 Qf ^pp£f^ 
ooOoo— 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rex Newman, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 950208-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 29, 1996) 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
Attorneys: Earl Xaiz and Hakeem Ishola, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Jan Graham and James H. Beadles, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Wilkins. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant, Rex Newman, appeals a jury verdict convicting him 
of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995), and of criminal trespass, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 
(1995) . We affirm. 
BACKGROUND1 
In the summer of 1993, Daniel Wolfe began constructing a 
home in Pleasant Grove, Utah, on an empty lot bordering property 
owned by Fred Newman. Concerned about the construction's effect 
on his property, Fred built a chicken-wire fence on the border 
between his property and Wolfe's lot. On July 30, 1993, Wolfe's 
subcontractors began excavating for the home's foundation. When 
1. We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. See, e.g.. State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 31 n.2 
(Utah App. 1996). 
Wolfe visited his lot that evening, he noticed the subcontractors 
had inadvertently piled a large mound of dirt against Fred's 
fence. The dirt caused the fence tc bulge in and some of the 
dirt had spilled through the fence cr.uo Fred's property. Wolfe 
began to move the dirt away from the fence with a trackhoe. 
Fred then appeared on Wolfe's property and accused Wolfe of 
destroying his fence and demanded that Wolfe stop work. Wolfe 
apologized and attempted to explain that he was trying to move 
the dirt away from the fence. As Wolfe continued to assure Fred 
that he would clean up the fence, Fred left. About ten minutes 
later, Fred returned with his brother Don Newman, and both Fred 
and Don began yelling taunts and threats at Wolfe. Soon 
thereafter, Fred's other brother, Rex Newman, the defendant in 
this appeal, arrived and joined his brothers in yelling at Wolfe 
and demanded that Wolfe move the dirt with a shovel, instead of 
with the trackhoe. To appease the brothers, Wolfe agreed to use 
a shovel. As Wolfe walked toward the street to retrieve a shovel 
from his truck, however, the brothers blocked his path and 
continued shouting. 
The confrontation escalated until the three brothers closely 
surrounded Wolfe. At some point, defendant yelled, "grab him," 
pulled Wolfe toward him by the shirt, and punched him squarely in 
the face. Wolfe crumpled to the ground and nearly lost 
consciousness, but was able to grab defendant's knees and pull 
him to the ground. Wolfe buried his head into defendant's 
stomach, enduring continued blows to the back and front of his 
head and to his rib cage. After a few minutes, a police officer 
arrived on the scene and broke up the fight. 
Wolfe suffered injuries to his nose, requiring two separate 
surgeries to correct. Defendant's blow also fractured seven of 
Wolfe's teeth, which had to be crowned, and chipped one tooth, 
which had to be glued together. All three Newman brothers were 
charged with aggravated assault and criminal trespass. All three 
were represented by a single attorney, Andrew McCullough. Before 
trial, McCullough requested that the Newman brothers' trial be 
severed, but the trial court denied this motion. McCullough 
expressed his concern about a potential conflict of interest 
among his clients, and stated he would discuss this concern with 
his clients and perhaps Bar counsel before proceeding further. 
During jury voir dire, prospective juror Tom Cryer indicated 
that he had been assaulted by his wife's ex-husband, whose last 
name was also Newman. In addition, Cryer said that the Mr. 
Newman who assaulted him lived in Pleasant Grove and "looks a lot 
like" the Newman brothers. The trial court asked Cryer if he 
could be impartial despite this experience. Cryer said he could 
and acknowledged that "the defendants can't really be responsible 
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for the actions of someone that's related to them." 
Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately struck Cryer for cause. 
At trial, several witnesses testified on behalf of the 
Newman brothers, including Don's wife and a nephew. All defense 
witnesses gave similar testimony about the encounter. According 
to the defense witnesses, defendant hit Wolfe in self-defense, 
and at all times, Wolfe was the aggressor. Although trial 
counsel indicated during his opening statement that defendant 
would testify, Don was the only brother to testify. After a 
four-day trial, all three brothers were convicted of criminal 
trespass. In addition, Don was convicted of simple assault, and 
defendant of aggravated assault. 
ISSUES 
Defendant's appeal raises the following issues: (1) Did 
trial counsel's representation of all three Newman brothers 
constitute a conflict of interest which rendered counsel's 
representation constitutionally ineffective; and (2) did 
potential juror Cryer's comment, concerning a previous encounter 
with someone who may have been related to the Newman brothers, 
prejudice the entire jury panel such that trial counsel's failure 
to move for a mistrial or ask for other curative measures denied 
defendant effective assistance of counsel? 
Because defendant's ineffectiveness claims arise for the 
first time on appeal, without a prior evidentiary hearing, the 
claims present a question of law. State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 
584, 591 (Utah App.), cert, granted. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
However, our review is highly deferential to counsel's trial 
decisions to avoid second-guessing tactical considerations. Id. 
Conflict of Interest 
Defendant first argues that trial counsel's motion to sever 
triggered the trial court's duty to ensure that counsel's 
representation of all three Newman brothers did not constitute a 
conflict of interest. The State counters that the trial court 
was not obliged to inquire further about a conflict where counsel 
informed the court he would investigate that possibility himself. 
Normally, to prevail on a claim that trial counsel's 
conflict of interest resulted in constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a defendant "must show that an actual 
conflict of interest existed which adversely affected his [or 
her] lawyer's performance." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah 
App. 1990), denial of habeas aff'd, 853 p.2d 898 (Utah), cert, 
denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), denial of habeas aff'd, 67 F.3d 
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312 (10th Cir. 1995); accord Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 
350, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1719 (1980). However, an actual conflict 
that adversely affected the lawyer's performance is presumed 
under "special circumstances" in which counsel puts the trial 
court on notice that a conflict probably exists. Cuyler. 446 
U.S. at 346-47, 100 S. Ct. at 1717. 
For example, in Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. 
Ct. 1173 (1978), defense counsel, representing three 
codefendants, moved to sever their trials and for appointment of 
separate counsel, on the grounds that he and the defendants 
themselves were concerned that their interests were conflicting. 
Id. at 478, 98 S. Ct. at 1175. The Holloway Court noted the 
following considerations: 
[First, a]n "attorney representing two 
defendants in a criminal matter is in the 
best position professionally and ethically to 
determine when a conflict of interest exists 
or will probably develop in the course of 
trial." Second, defense attorneys have the 
obligation, upon discovering a conflict of 
interest, to advise the court at once of the 
problem. Finally, attorneys are officers of 
the court, and lf,when they address the judge 
solemnly upon a matter before the court, 
their declarations are virtually made under 
oath."« 
Id. at 485-86, 98 S. Ct. at 1179 (footnotes and citations 
omitted). Accordingly, the Court determined that the trial 
court's failure to heed counsel's repeatedly-expressed concerns 
constituted reversible error, irrespective of whether defendant 
had demonstrated any actual conflict or prejudice. Id. at 484-85, 
98 S. Ct. at 1178-79. 
Nevertheless, under the Holloway rationale, trial courts 
generally may rely on counsel to discover and appropriately deal 
with any conflicts, in cases involving multiple representation. 
Cuyler. 446 U.S. at 346-47, 100 S. Ct. at 1717. Thus, where 
counsel makes no objection at trial, the trial court may presume 
that no improper conflict due to joint representation is present. 
Id. at 348, 100 S. Ct. at 1718; Webb. 790 P.2d at 73. Similarly, 
trial courts may rely on counsel's representations that he or she 
has or will investigate the possibility of conflicts and notify 
the court if any conflict arises. £££ United States v. Kidding. 
560 F.2d 1303, 1310 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 872, 98 S. 
Ct. 217 (1977). 
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... Kidding, defense counsel assur ed the coi n: t that after 
jssing joint representation wi t:h his clients, he felt there 
would be no conflict, and if any conflict should arise, he would 
immediately advise his clients to obtain separate counsel. 1d, 
Under these facts, the reviewing court stated it was reasonable 
for the trial judge to infer that counsel and his clients had 
made an informed decision to proceed with joint representation. 
Id. The Kidding court therefore concluded the trial court had no 
obligation to delve further into the matter. Id. 
Thus, *;.t^  _. . .,; •_ ,;rney representing more than one 
codefendant clearly informs the trial court of "the probable i L LK 
of a conflict of interest," there is a presumption that the 
codefendants' constitutional right to counsel is compromised. 
Holloway. 435 U.S. at 484-85, 98 S. Ct. at 1178-79 (emphasis 
added); accord Cuyler. 446 U.S. at 345-46, 100 S. Ct. at 1716-
Webb. 790 P.2d at 72. In such'special circumstances, if the 
trial court fails "either to appoint separate counsel or to take 
adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to 
warrant separate counsel," the defendants are deprived of their 
constitutionally guaranteed assistance of counsel. Holloway, 43 5 
U.S. at 484, 98 S. Ct. at 1178; accord Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 
100 S. Ct. at 1718; J£ebb# 790 P.2d at 72-73. Absent these 
special circumstances, however, a defendant can prevail on a 
conflict of interest ineffectiveness of counsel claim only by 
demonstrating an actual conflict which affected his or her 
attorneys performance. Webb, 790 P.2d at 73. A defendant who 
makes this showing need not demonstrate prejudice. Id. 
In the instant case, trial counsel did not inform the trial 
court of a probability of a conflict among the Newman brothers. 
Although counsel filed a motion to sever the brothers1 trial, 
such a motion would not necessarily have put the court on notice 
of an actual conflict. If the alleged actual conflict in this 
case--that trial counsel would need to emphasize the other 
brothers1 culpability while de-emphasizing defendant's--was a 
real danger, the court might have expected counsel to move for 
appointment of separate counsel for each codefendant, 
More importantly, during arguments* on the motion to se v ei: , 
counsel indicated that he would investigate the possibility of a 
conflict and would discuss the matter with his clients. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court properly relied on counsel's 
statements and on counsel's decision to proceed with the multiple 
representation. Cf. id. at 74 ("In the absence of other facts or 
circumstances that should reasonably bring a conflict of 
interests between codefendants to the trial court's attention, we 
decline to hold that . . a trial judge "knows or reasonably 
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should know1 before or at trial of a conflict suggested in an 
abandoned pretrial severance motion.").2 
Defendant also argues that the record demonstrates an actual 
conflict of interest which affected his representation. To this 
end, defendant contends that each Newman brother had varying 
defenses and degrees of culpability, that trial counsel did not 
refer to defendant frequently enough in opening and closing 
statements, and that trial counsel should have called defendant 
to testify after earlier stating he would. We agree with the 
State, however, that defendant has not shown an actual conflict. 
11
 In order to show an actual conflict of interest existed, a 
defendant must point to specific instances in the record to 
suggest an actual conflict or impairment of his or her 
interests." Webb. 790 P.2d at 75. However, "hypothetical or 
speculative conflicts will not suffice to establish a violation." 
State v. Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 923 (Utah App. 1990). This 
court has acknowledged that "a substantial disparity of evidence 
incriminating each defendant" may, in certain circumstances, 
evince an actual conflict. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76 (citing 
Armstrong v. People. 701 P.2d 17, 22 (Colo. 1985) (en banc)). 
In Armstrong, a husband and wife, represented by a single 
attorney, were charged with conspiracy to commit aggravated 
robbery, while the husband was separately charged with aggravated 
robbery, second degree kidnapping, aggravated car theft, second 
degree burglary, and felony theft. 701 P.2d at 18-19. Both 
husband and wife were tried together and convicted. Id. at 19. 
2. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require federal trial 
courts to take a much more active role, in cases of multiple 
representation, in investigating possible conflicts and in 
advising defendants of their rights regarding separate 
representation. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) (requiring trial 
courts to scrutinize any case of joint representation and to take 
steps necessary to ensure no conflict exists, including 
personally advising defendants of their right to effective, 
conflict-free counsel). Moreover, some jurisdictions presume 
prejudice in any case involving multiple representation, unless 
the trial court investigates further or obtains the codefendants1 
consent on the record. See, e.g.. Shoncrutsie v. State. 827 P.2d 
361, 367 (Wyo. 1992). Nonetheless, these steps are not dictated 
by the United States Constitution and have not been adopted by 
rule or case law in Utah. Even so, to avoid claims such as 
defendant's, when codefendants are represented by a single 
attorney, Utah trial courts might consider obtaining consent to 
such joint representation on the record. See also State v. 
Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 924 n.3 (Utah App. 1990). 
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m
*~- Colorado Supreme Court reversed the convictions because e 
-•:-r=it bulk of the evidence introduced at trial was directed 
— * ± Ithe husband's] alleged culpability..," and thus "defense 
el could not properly refer to the disparate charges of 
conduct or comment about this state of the evidence to 
„ id. at 22 
The instant case is fundamentally disting uishable from 
Armstrong. All three Newman brothers were charged essential] y 
with the same crimes. In addition, the disparity between what 
defendant and his codefendants were convicted of is not nearly so 
extreme as the disparities in charges and convictions present in 
Armstrong. Thus, the likelihood of a conflict, present in 
Armstrong/ in n<""'! present here. 
Furthermore, we find -'~g suspect about choosing the 
common, unified defense that Wolfe was the aggressor at all 
times. QLs. Holloway. 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S. Ct. at 1178 {»"A 
common defense often gives strength against a common attack 'ff 
(quoting Glasser v. United States. 315 U.S. 60, 92, 62 S. Ct. 
457, 475 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))). This strategy 
was consistently adhered to by all defense witnesses, including 
codefendant Don Newman. Even on appeal, defendant does not 
disparage this defense, but instead simply asserts that counsel 
failed adequately to de-emphasize his culpability. We find 
defendant's speculative, unsupported contentions in this regard 
to be without merit. Cf. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76 ("There is 
absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that counselfs choice 
of the united defense strategy, which Webb apparently supported 
enthusiastically until it produced an unfavorable verdict, was in 
any way prompted by a desire or effort to bolster [the 
codefendant' s] defense at Webb's expense."); see also Giles v. 
State. 877 P.2d 365, 367 (Idaho 1994), cert, denied. U.S. _ , 
115 S. Ct. 942 (1995) ("Defendants consistently maintained that 
they had not committed the acts charged, and there was no 
evidence produced to show that they would have changed their 
defense strategies if they had had separate attorneys. Thus, 
[the codefendants] make no showing of an actual conflict of 
interest in the joint representation."). 
Defendant's remaining conflict claims rest upon pure 
conjecture. For instance, defendant suggests that absent a 
conflict of interest, trial counsel would have referred to 
defendant more frequently in opening and closing statements. We 
fail to see, however, how this alleged shortcoming on counsel's 
part compels a conclusion that a conflict of interest existed. 
Similarly, deienactnt theorizes that trial counsel somehow 
infringed his right to testify. Despite this bare assertion, 
defendant cites no record evidence that suggests he wished to 
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testify, but was actively prevented from doing so. Absent any 
other information, the mere fact that defendant did not testify, 
even after counsel initially indicated to the jury that he would, 
does not necessarily mean counsel silenced defendant because of a 
conflict of interest. On the contrary, the decision that 
defendant not testify could have been made for any number of 
legitimate tactical reasons. 
Moreover, defendant offers no details about what his 
testimony would have been. Instead, he relies on this court's 
decision in State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991), and 
suggests a conflict is manifest whenever a codefendant is not 
called to testify. However, Johnson involved a clear conflict 
between defense counsel and the defendant, where counsel was 
implicated in the same dealings for which the defendant was being 
tried. Id. at 486-87. In that limited circumstance, this court 
found that counsel1s failure to call defendant to testify was a 
factor demonstrating counsel's conflict with his client. Id. at 
490. Conversely, there is no special reason in this case to 
assume that defendant's failure to testify was a result of a 
conflict, as opposed to some other valid consideration. Thus, 
the mere fact that defendant did not testify does not establish a 
conflict in this case. 
Because trial counsel told the court he would investigate 
any possible conflicts among the Newman brothers, the court was 
not obliged to further explore the matter. Moreover, defendant's 
speculation about how trial counsel might have performed 
differently and why defendant did not testify does not establish 
that counsel labored under an actual conflict which affected his 
performance. Therefore, defendant's claim that a conflict of 
interest denied him the effective assistance of counsel fails. 
Potential Juror's Comment 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel ineffectively 
responded to prospective juror dryer1s statements that he had 
previously been assaulted by someone whose last name was Newman 
and who resembled the Newman brothers. Although the trial court 
struck Cryer for cause, defendant argues that Cryer's statement 
prejudiced the entire jury panel to the extent that any 
reasonably prudent attorney would have asked for a mistrial or 
curative instruction. 
To succeed on this ineffectiveness claim, defendant must 
demonstrate both that counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that such unreasonable 
performance was prejudicial. E.g.. State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 
37, 39 (Utah 1996); Webb. 790 P.2d at 72. To establish 
inadequate performance, defendant must overcome a strong 
950208-CA 8 
presumption that legitimate tactical considera;-- ^ .-s 
strategies motivated counsel's actions at trial, E.g.. State v. 
Tennyson. 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Strickland 
v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). 
To show prejudice, defendant must demonstrate that "but fox 
counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different." Hovater, 914 P.2d at 39 (citing Strickland, 466 U S 
at 688, 694, 104 s. ct. at 2064, 2068); accord State v, Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 186-87 '"^v, ioon\. 
In arguing that c~-u-^ cl request a mistrial or 
other curative instructions prejudiced his jury, defendant relies 
on State v. Ferguson. 618 P.2d 1186 (Kan. 1980). In Ferguson, a 
potential juror indicated, during voir dire and in front of the 
other panelists, that the State had chosen a good prosecutor for 
the case and that the State would not have pressed charges unless 
substantial evidence had been collected. Id. at 1193, The 
panelist was stricken for cause. Id, Subsequently, the trial 
court denied the defense's motion for mistrial, but admonished 
the remaining panelists to disregard the dismissed panel member's 
remarks and examined the panelists individually to ensure they 
could remain impartial. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the 
verdict, emphasizing both the trial court's curative precautions 
and the notion that a potential juror indicating bias is 
generally not grounds for dismissing the entire panel. IsL. 
Defendant posits that the Ferguson court would not have 
affirmed, absent the trial court's remedial precautions, and that 
such remedial precautions or a mistrial were necessary in his 
trial, but not requested by his trial counsel. However, the 
potential for prejudice in Ferguson--the inference that the 
prospective juror knew the prosecutor personally and was vouching 
for her credibility--was far more serious than any potential for 
prejudice here. In this case, the most any panelist could have 
taken from Cryer's comments was that he had been in a fight with 
some relative of the Newmans, in a situation wholly unrelated to 
the case at hand. Cf. Reynolds v. State. 686 S.W.2d 264, 267-68 
(Tex. App. 1985) (finding jury panel not prejudiced where "any 
inference which may have been derived from [the potential 
juror's] statement of an incident foreign to [defendant's] case 
was oblique" and assuming jury followed trial court's standard 
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt instructions). 
Moreover, Cryer himself conceded that "the defendants can't 
really be responsible for their relatives' actions." Thus, the 
greater potential for prejudice in Ferguson warranted stronger 
precautionary measures than were warranted i n the instant case. 
Considering the Isolated and innocuous nature of Cryer's 
comments, it was unnecessary for th* *rr •=! court to question < 
panel member about bias, and there was no basis for a mistrial. 
We must presume then that counsel chose, for tactical reasons, 
not to emphasize the comments further by requesting a mistrial or 
special instructions. fijL. State v. Wight. 765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah 
App. 1988) (finding defense counsel's decision to proceed with 
murder trial "a legitimate tactical judgement11 where after trial 
began, juror stated she knew the victim's wife); see also Boggess 
Y, State, 655 P.2d 654, 656 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, because 
any additional action was unnecessary, counsel's failure to 
request such action could not have prejudiced defendant. 
Therefore, defendant's second claim of error fails. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the trial court properly relied on counsel's 
representations that he would investigate the possibility of a 
conflict of interest among the Newman brothers. The trial court 
thus had no duty to delve further into the matter. Moreover, 
defendant has failed to show that counsel labored under an actual 
conflict of interest which adversely affected his performance. 
Finally, counsel's failure to draw undue attention to a 
prospective juror's extraneous comments did not constitute 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, 
defendant has not demonstrated that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel. We therefore affirm his conviction. 
Pamela T. Greenwood? Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
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